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RETHINKING IMMIGRATION’S MANDATORY DETENTION
REGIME: POLITICS, PROFIT, AND THE MEANING
OF “CUSTODY”
Philip L. Torrey*

INTRODUCTION
Immigration detention in the United States is a crisis that needs
immediate attention. U.S. immigration detention facilities hold a
staggering number of persons. Widely believed to have the largest
immigration detention population in the world, the United States
detained approximately 478,000 foreign nationals in Fiscal Year
2012.1 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the
agency responsible for immigration enforcement, boasts that the
figure is “an all-time high.”2
In some ways, these numbers are unsurprising, considering that
the United States incarcerates approximately one in every one hundred adults within its borders—a rate five to ten times higher than
any other Westernized country.3 An immigration law, known as the
mandatory detention statute, is partially to blame for this recordbreaking immigration detention population. Under this law, facilities may hold noncitizens without providing them an opportunity to
ask for release.
As currently interpreted by DHS, the mandatory detention statute requires the detention of any noncitizen in removal
proceedings who falls into any of the broad categories listed in the
*
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Clinical Instructor, Harvard Immigration and
Refugee Clinical Program; Supervising Attorney, Harvard Immigration Project; B.A., Colgate
University, 2002; J.D., with honors, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2008. The
author would like to thank Professor Deborah Anker, Sabi Ardalan, and Alexis Williams
Torrey for their helpful editorial suggestions and Katherine Soltis for her valuable research
assistance.
1.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT 1
(Dec. 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforce
ment_ar_2012_1.pdf; see Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in Immigration Detention and Alternatives to Detention: Practical, Political and Symbolic Rationales, 1 J. ON MIGRATION
AND HUMAN SEC. 97, 101 n.11 (2013) (noting that over 429,000 immigrants were detained in
2012).
2.
See id.
3.
NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (Jeremy Travis & Bruce Western eds., 2014). The United
States holds nearly twenty-five percent of the world’s prisoners despite having only five percent of the global population. Id.
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statute. The mandatory detention statute states that DHS “shall take
into custody” any noncitizen:
• Who committed a “crime involving moral turpitude”;
• Who has two or more criminal convictions;
• Whom DHS believes is a drug trafficker;
• Who committed any prostitution-related offense;
• Who committed any money laundering-related offense;
• Who committed an “aggravated felony”;
• Who committed any drug-related offense;
• Who committed any firearms-related offense; or
• Whom DHS believes has engaged in any terrorist-related
activities.4
The statute has been interpreted as stripping DHS and Immigration Judges of their discretion to release an individual who falls into
one of the broad categories listed above. Ultimately, this consistently funnels noncitizens into the immigration detention system—a
system that is costly, harsh, and virtually immune from constitutional oversight.
Essentially, immigration detention is criminal detention but without the constitutional protections. Courts do not regard
immigration detention and deportation as punishment; therefore,
immigration law is considered civil law.5 Consequently, individuals
4.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). Application of the mandatory detention statute depends on whether a noncitizen is considered to be inadmissible or deportable, and may
depend on the length of a criminal sentence. See id. But, for the purposes of this Article, the
distinctions are inconsequential. A crime that involves “moral turpitude” is one that includes
“an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general.” See BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 2247 (3d ed. 1914).
“Aggravated felonies” are statutorily defined and include a wide range of offenses from murder to bribery of a witness. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(A)–(U) (2008). A more complete
discussion of “crimes involving moral turpitude” and “aggravated felonies” can be found in
DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES §§ 6:1–6:6,
7:22–7:46 (2014). Other bases for mandatorily detaining a noncitizen, including those subject to administrative removal, expedited removal, and reinstatement, are beyond the scope
of this article.
5.
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“The [removal] proceedings at
issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they are nonpunitive in purpose and
effect.”); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–38 (1952) (noting that “[d]eportation is not a
criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment” and that “[d]etention is
necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”); see also Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 141–42 (2009) (“The well-known
constitutional maxim that deportation (now “removal”) is not punishment provides longstanding precedent for important legal distinctions between civil immigration proceedings
and criminal proceedings.” (internal citations omitted)); César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (“[D]espite
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facing immigration detention and deportation do not have the
same constitutional protections as defendants facing criminal incarceration.6 Some of the traditional constitutional protections
inapplicable in the immigration context include the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, the prohibition
on ex post facto laws, the right to appointed counsel, and the ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.7 The Fifth Amendment requires
immigration proceedings to be “fundamentally fair.” But statutes
and regulations—not the Constitution—provide specific due process protections because Congress has plenary power concerning
federal immigration policy.8
Despite its characterization as civil confinement, a closer look at
immigration detention reveals that is often harsher than criminal
detention. Immigration detainees are held in roughly 257 detention facilities around the country, which are either operated by
state and local law enforcement agencies or by for-profit corporations.9 Immigration detainees are often held in the same units as
criminal detainees, with conditions that include shackling, solitary
confinement, and lack access to proper nutrition, exercise, and basic healthcare.10 In fact, there have been 111 reported deaths in
immigration detention largely due to improper medical attention
and suicide.11 Some of the worst conditions are found in privately
immigration detention’s legal characterization as civil, individuals in immigration confinement are frequently perceived to be no different than individuals in penal confinement.”).
6.
See, e.g., Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 675 (2015) (analyzing noncitizens’ inability to cross-examine police officers in immigration
proceedings because the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply); Mark
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012) (analyzing the
lack of appointed counsel for noncitizens using the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution).
7.
Many scholars have written on the lack of constitutional protections in immigration
proceedings. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011).
8.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government by counsel of the alien’s choosing who
is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (2014) (“The alien
may be represented in proceedings before an Immigration Judge by an attorney or other
representative of his or her choice . . . at no expense to the government.”).
9.
NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS
FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2, 4 (2013), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/mathofimmigrationdetention.pdf
[hereinafter MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION].
10. See Conditions in Immigration Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www
.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2383 (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
11. Id. (highlighting that 111 deaths have been reported since 2003, “many . . . by a lack
of timely and thorough medical care and nearly one fifth of them have been suicides.”).
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owned prisons, which in 2011 held roughly half of the U.S. immigrant detention population.12
Immigration detention is unnecessarily costly. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a $2 billion budget devoted
to detention operations—much of which goes to private prison
companies that contract with DHS to provide detention beds.13
Congress has committed so much funding to the detention and deportation of noncitizens that DHS’s overall budget is now larger
than the budgets of all other federal law enforcement agencies
combined.14 Estimates indicate that it costs roughly $166 per day to
keep a person in immigration detention, but alternatives to detention, such as electronic monitoring, DHS check-ins, and curfews,
can cost as little as 70 cents per day.15
Many claim that although immigration detention is expensive, it
is necessary to prevent noncitizens from skipping out on immigration orders and to stop violent noncitizens from committing serious
crimes in the future.16 But the statistics show otherwise. In a 2009
snapshot of the immigration detention system, DHS admitted that
the 30,000 detainees held on that day had “a low propensity for
violence” and only eleven percent had previously been convicted of
a violent offense.17 Furthermore, “[b]etween 2009 and 2011, over
half of all immigrant detainees had no criminal records. Of those
with any criminal history, nearly 20 percent were merely for traffic
12. MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 9, at 7–8; see Michael McLaughlin, 10
Worst Immigrant Detention Centers Should be Closed, Detention Watch Network Report Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/16/
worst-detention-centers-detention-watch-network_n_2138999.html (“Private companies operate some of the prisons and jails on the list . . . .”).
13. See MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 9, at 2–4.
14. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 20–21 (2013), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery.
15. See MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 9, at 1, 9; Garance Burke & Laura
Wides-Munoz, Immigrants prove big business for prison companies, MSNBC (Aug. 22, 2013), http:/
/www.msnbc.com/msnbc/immigrants-prove-big-business-prison?lite=.
16. See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 140 (“Stated simply, the first-order policy goals of immigration
detention are to ensure that the federal government may effectuate its decisions to exclude
or deport noncitizens from the United States and to protect the public from any danger that
may be posed by noncitizens pending this process.”); Jessica Vaughan, DHS Sec. Johnson Disputes Detention Bed Mandate, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://cis.org/
vaughan/dhs-sec-johnson-disputes-detention-bed-mandate (opining that it is necessary to
spend billions of dollars to detain noncitizens with criminal convictions to ensure their removal and protect the public).
17. See DR. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
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offenses.”18 Additionally, studies show that alternative-to-detention
programs are highly effective in ensuring appearances at future removal hearings.19
This Article proposes a solution to the unnecessarily costly and
overly broad immigration detention regime. It argues that the
mandatory detention statute can be interpreted to afford DHS and
Immigration Judges discretion to make custody determinations that
utilize alternatives to detention that are less costly and more humane. First, the term “custody” in the mandatory detention statute
should be interpreted broadly to include alternatives to detention.
Alternatively, if the term “custody” continues to be narrowly interpreted to require physical confinement, DHS should utilize
detention alternatives as “terms of confinement.” Part III further
explains these hypotheses.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of mandatory detention
in the United States. Part II examines how the rise of the private
prison industry, which spends millions of dollars lobbying Congress
and contributing to Congressional campaigns, significantly influenced the continued use of immigration detention. Part II, Section
A provides a brief overview of the private prison industry, including
its history and the current conditions in some private prison facilities. Part II, Section B examines the industry’s rise in political
power. This Section also details how increased lobbying efforts correspond to increased profits for the industry despite its claim that it
does not lobby on issues pertaining to immigration policy. Finally,
Part III discusses two ways in which immigration officials can interpret the mandatory detention statute to regain discretion in making
custody determinations.

I. THE HISTORY

OF

MANDATORY IMMIGRATION DETENTION

Since the late 19th century, laws fueled by concerns about race,
political ideologies, the economy, crime, and terrorism have shaped
the mandatory detention regime. To understand why the problem
18. MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 9, at 5.
19. See, e.g., LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
(ATD): HISTORY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2013), available at http://lirs.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/LIRS-Backgrounder-on-Alternatives-to-Detention-3-12-13.pdf (showing a
compliance rate of at least ninety percent in three separate studies); DETENTION WATCH NETWORK & MILLS LEGAL CLINIC, STANFORD L. SCH., IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, POLICY BRIEF:
COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2010), available at https://www
.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/163220/doc/slspublic/DWN_ATD_Report
_FINAL.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of community-based alternatives to detention).
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of mandatory detention continues to exist and how to fix it, a review of the history of mandatory detention in the United States is
necessary. Section A describes the first one hundred years of federal
immigration detention. It focuses on how U.S. immigration detention policies were used to simultaneously facilitate the entry of
European migrants to the East Coast of the U.S. and to preclude
Asian migrants from entering the West Coast. This Part then discusses how the government used detention to neutralize perceived
political enemies of the United States before and during the Cold
War. Section B examines the political climate of the 1980s, which
immediately preceded the creation of today’s mandatory detention
statute.

A. Early Immigration Detention Policies and Practices
Federal immigration detention policies began with the creation
of a federal immigration inspection system in 1882.20 Previously,
states used their police power to develop and enforce their own
immigration policies concerning detention of noncitizens.21 Those
policies were largely based on fears about both the spread of communicable diseases brought by new entrants and the entry of
persons who would drain state-funded services.22 Early federal immigration policies were influenced by the same concerns.23 But
immigration detention was used sparingly on the East Coast, mostly
to ensure the orderly entry of European migrants after inspection.24
Immigration detention policies on the West Coast, however, were
fueled by racial discrimination.25 Over time, discrimination based
on political opinion became an additional influence on detention
policies and practices.

20. See Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 21–22 (2010).
21. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1996).
22. See id. at 23–34.
23. See id.
24. See DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 11 (2012).
25. See infra Part I.A.2, and accompanying notes; see also Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1866-1898: Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Acts, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration (last visited May 7,
2015) (“American objections to Chinese immigration took many forms, and generally
stemmed from economic and cultural tensions, as well as ethnic discrimination.”).
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1. The East Coast Model: Detention as a Tool
to Facilitate Admission
Despite the shift from multiple state immigration systems to a
unified federal immigration system, no legal statutory basis existed
for detaining a migrant seeking entry until the Immigration Act of
1891.26 On the East Coast, immigration detention was effectively a
tool to guarantee a thorough inspection before entry: “[I]nspection
officers may order a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time and place, and then and there detain
them until a thorough inspection is made.”27 Although the 1891 Act
provided no statutory basis for releasing a new arrival from detention prior to inspection, the informal practice of releasing a
detainee on bond quickly developed in the East Coast’s main port
of New York City.28
Congress quickly condemned these new release practices because they circumvented the inspection process.29 In an 1892
report, Congress suggested that detention was mandatory prior to
inspection for those seeking entry into the United States. Admonishing immigration authorities, Congress wrote that it could “fill the
statute book with laws, but without faithful, competent, impartial,
and intelligent interpretation and administration of them, they are
worthless paper.”30
In 1893, Congress passed the first law requiring the detention of
certain immigrants.31 The new law ordered, “every inspector of arriving alien immigrants to detain for a special inquiry . . . every
person who may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt
entitled to admission.”32 Immigration officers were precluded from
exercising their discretion in making custody determinations, unless it was obvious that the new arrival was entitled to entry.33
According to one commentator, the new law “reflected the view,
26. WILSHER, supra note 24 at 11.
27. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.
28. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 14.
29. For example, an 1892 Congressional report cited numerous examples of charitable
organizations paying for the release of new immigrants who would have otherwise been detained as paupers likely to become public charges. See id..
30. Id. (citing H.R. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, IMMIGRATION INVESTIGATION, H.R. REP. NO. 2090, at 12 (1892) (giving examples of Hebrew charities using their own
assets to secure bond for paupers and others).
31. Id. at 15.
32. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 26, 27, Stat. 569 (providing for enforcement of the immigration and contract-labor laws of the United States).
33. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 15.
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confirmed by judicial doctrine of the time, that migrants were essentially beyond constitutional protection until authorized to be
admitted.”34
Immigration officers often defied the new law and continued to
release new arrivals on bond.35 At the time, bond was usually used
as insurance against the noncitizen becoming a public charge.36 If
the bonded out immigrant became destitute after release, then
bond was revoked and he or she was re-detained.37 The practice
allowed new arrivals the chance to prove that they could survive in
U.S. society without relying on public coffers, and it reflected immigration officials’ “desire for flexibility and pragmatism over the use
of detention.”38
Most immigrants arriving in New York during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries were from Europe and were usually allowed
entry after a brief inspection. According to the Commissioner of
Immigration in New York at the time, eighty or eighty-five percent
of migrants seeking entry through New York were allowed to enter
without being detained.39 The remaining fifteen to twenty percent
of new arrivals were detained for short periods of time due to minor illness or until they could prove they were not destitute.40 The
Commissioner claimed that he ultimately excluded less than one
percent of all migrants arriving in New York.41

2. The West Coast Model: Detention as a Tool
for Racial Discrimination
Unlike the European arrivals in New York, the arrival of Asian
migrants on the West Coast during the mid to late 19th century
triggered racist immigration detention practices.42 A rising anti-Chinese movement caused the same detention policies to be enforced
disproportionately on Asian entrants on the West Coast.43 Officials
subjected Asian immigrants to lengthy detention simply because of
34. Id. at 15; see infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the judicial doctrine concerning the
constitutional rights afforded migrants seeking entry.
35. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 15–16.
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 3021, at 20 (1906).
37. WILSHER, supra note 24, at 17.
38. See id.
39. S. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION, FOREIGN IMMIGRATION, S. REP. 3119 (1902).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Office of the Historian, supra note 25.
43. See Benson, supra note 20, at 21–25; Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1683, 1711–13 (2009).
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their race; many immigrants challenged their detention in federal
courts.44
In a series of striking judicial decisions that upheld the racist policies, the U.S. Supreme Court punted immigration policy-making
authority to Congress, offering little oversight from the judiciary.45
Congress’s new plenary power gave it the ability to pass racially-motived immigration laws while courts sat by idly.46
Executive branch immigration officers then interpreted and enforced those laws with equal impunity. In numerous cases filed by
petitioners of Asian descent, the U.S. Supreme Court held that individual custody determinations by immigration officials were largely
unreviewable. In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court first considered the
issue of immigration detention in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.47
Interpreting the Immigration Act of 1891, the Court found that “it
is impossible to construe [the Act] as giving the courts jurisdiction
to determine matters which the act has expressly committed to the
final determination of executive officers.”48 Four years later, the
Court held that immigration detainees had no right to due process
protections because immigration detention was simply “temporary
confinement as part of the means necessary to give effect to the
provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens.”49

3. Detention of Political Dissidents under the Guise
of National Security
In the early 1900s, the target of immigration detention policies
turned to perceived political enemies. Interior immigration enforcement and detention increased dramatically. National security
44. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 22; Benson, supra note 20, at 21–25 (discussing the use
of immigration detention in the late 1800s).
45. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also NEUMAN, supra
note 21, at 14 (“In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court transformed this characterization of international law into a constitutional doctrine of Congress’s ‘plenary power’ to
exclude or expel aliens, unconstrained by any judicially enforceable constitutional limits”).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to strike down federal immigration policy rooted in
racism set immigration law down a peculiar and unique constitutional path. See generally
Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (“Immigration law is constitutionally distinct.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (comparing immigration law and mainstream constitutional
law).
46. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
47. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
48. Id. at 664.
49. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
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concerns prompted immigration officials to use immigration detention as a tool to detain suspected Bolsheviks, anarchists, and labor
organizers.50 Similar to bond practices in the late 19th century,
some detainees were released from detention and afforded the opportunity to show that they would discontinue their politically
subversive behavior.51
During the Cold War, officials generally discontinued the practice of discretionary release in cases of suspected Communists.52
Like the cases filed by Asian migrants in the late 19th century, similar claims filed by political dissidents held in prolonged detention
allowed courts to further limit the constitutional protections afforded to immigrant detainees. In the 1952 case Carlson v. Landon,
the Supreme Court held that immigration authorities could detain
noncitizens suspected of belonging to the Communist Party without
a hearing because the detention was sufficiently related to national
security.53
In his dissent, Justice Black wrote that detention without the opportunity to request release on bond was a violation of the “Eighth
Amendment’s ban against excessive bail; First Amendment’s ban
against abridgement of thought, speech and press; Fifth Amendment’s ban against depriving a person of liberty without due
process of law.”54 Justice Black explained that immigration custody
determinations, which are largely unreviewable and not subject to
due process protections, must be related to the enforcement of immigration policies:
[I]t is not necessary to keep [Communists] in jail to assure
their compliance with a deportation order, their imprisonment cannot possibly be intended as an aid to deportation.
They are kept in jail solely because a bureau agent thinks that
is where Communists should be. A power to put in jail because
dangerous cannot be derived from a power to deport. . . . I
think that condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary
in accordance with procedural “due process of law.”55

50. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 30.
51. See id. at 31.
52. Id. at 62.
53. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 535–37 (1952) (reasoning that the Communist
Party promoted violent activities related to overthrowing the U.S. government).
54. Id. at 548 (Black, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 551–55.
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The omnibus Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),
enacted shortly after Carlson, echoed Justice Black’s dissent. According to one commentator, “[t]he 1952 Act was an important first
expression by Congress of the need for alternative arrangements to
separate out detention from deportation issues.”56 Under the INA,
authorities could grant a noncitizen release from detention on
bond, pending a final determination of removability.57 Detention
rates subsequently fell as immigration authorities exercised their
discretion by releasing noncitizens who were neither a flight risk
nor a danger to the community.58
Although the INA also gave federal courts jurisdiction to review
custody determinations, the 1953 case Shaughnessy v. United States ex.
rel. Mezei demonstrated the Court’s continued reluctance to review
such determinations—especially those involving alleged political
dissidents.59 In Mezei, a petitioner returning from a trip “behind the
Iron Curtain” was detained at Ellis Island for three years based on
secret information the U.S. government refused to disclose.60 Relying on previous cases, such as Nishimura Ekiu, the Court reasoned
that due process rights afforded to immigrants in prolonged detention were governed solely by acts of Congress and were not meant
for judicial oversight.61 In reaching its decision the Court compared
the petitioner’s detention to humanitarian relief; his stay at Ellis
Island was considered a “temporary haven” afforded to him by “an
act of legislative grace.”62
Justice Jackson penned a passionate dissent in Mezei. Recognizing
the majority’s illogical characterization of the returning immigrant’s detention, he wrote:

56. WILSHER, supra note 24, at 65.
57. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 242(a), 66 Stat.
163, 208–09 (1952) (“Any such alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final determination of deportability, be continued in custody
. . . or be released under bond.”).
58. See WILSHER, supra note 24, at 64 (“In 1955, of 200,000 arrivals at the port of New
York, astonishingly only sixteen were detained.”); see also MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE
IMMIGRATION PRISONS 6–7 (2004) (“The Immigration and Naturalization Service announced
in 1954 that it was ‘abandoning the policy of detention,’ according to refugee expert Arthur
Helton, except in rare cases when an alien was considered likely to ‘abscond’ or to pose a
danger to the nation or community.”).
59. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
60. See id. at 208, 214.
61. See id. at 212 (“[A]n alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different
footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.’ ”).
62. Id. at 207, 215.
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Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of
forces which keeps him as effectually as a prison, the dominant
and proximate of these forces being the United States immigration authority. . . . We must regard this alien as deprived of
liberty, and the question is whether the deprivation is a denial
of due process of law.63
Like Justice Black’s dissent in Carlson, Justice Jackson believed
that the noncitizen should be afforded due process, including the
opportunity for a fair hearing on the merits of his detention.64 He
wrote, “It is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice
and fair dealing would menace the security of this country. No one
can make me believe that we are that far gone.”65

B. The Abrupt Arrival of Today’s Mandatory Detention Statute
Shifting attitudes about noncitizens continued to shape immigration detention policies and practices in the 1980s and 1990s. Like
the 1890s, Congress questioned immigration authorities’ ability to
make sound custody determinations in the 1980s. Consequently, in
1988, Congress enacted the current mandatory detention statute,
which was subsequently broadened in the 1990s. As discussed below, the law and its expansion was essentially a product of Congress
conflating immigration with a slumping economy, rising crime, and
terrorism.

1. “Economic Migrants” Precipitate a Shift in Immigration
Detention Practices
Other than the recent 2008 recession, the recession during the
early 1980s was the worst post-World War II economic crisis to hit
the United States.66 Immigration enforcement priorities reflected
worries about the economy. Immigration officials stated that enforcement recourses would be used on border security and the
deportation of immigrants who were in “lucrative jobs at the expense of citizens and lawful aliens.”67
63. Id. at 220–21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 228.
65. Id.
66. Richard C. Auxier, Reagan’s Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www
.pewresearch.org/2010/12/14/reagans-recession/.
67. DOW, supra note 58, at 7.
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The mass arrival of Cuban refugees and so-called “economic migrants” from Haiti in the 1970s and early 1980s also influenced
immigration detention practices.68 In April 1980, nearly 125,000
Cubans left the port of Mariel, Cuba for the United States.69 President Carter welcomed the refugees from America’s most
prominent foe in the Western Hemisphere. The Cubans were initially detained in Miami but then processed and quickly released.70
Flotillas of Haitians seeking refuge in the United States around
the same time prompted a much different response from the new
Reagan Administration. The Administration stopped Haitians from
entering the United States because they were considered economic
migrants who did not qualify as asylees under new U.S. refugee
law.71 In 1981, Reagan brokered an agreement with Haitian dictator
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to
interdict Haitian boats in open waters, preventing them from landing on U.S. soil and requesting asylum.72 The Haitians who did
make it to the United States were immediately put into detention
facilities and held for lengthy periods of time.73
In addition to the Haitian refugee crisis, the Reagan Administration’s support of politically conservative Central American guerrilla
groups at war against leftist governments triggered a further rise in
68. See generally Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39 (1999) (discussing the history of U.S. and Cuban relations and documenting U.S. immigration policy of
Cubans and Haitians in the late twentieth century); Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane,
Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United States, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747 (1993) (arguing that Haitian entrants in the 1970s were improperly categorized as economic migrants rather than
refugees); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the
Porous Border of the Plenary Power, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1100–02 (1995) (analyzing
the shift in U.S. detention policies with the incarceration of Marielito Cubans and Haitians in
the 1980s).
69. Carl Hulse, Echoes of Past Battles on Immigration Ring Through Current Debate, N.Y. TIMES
(July 26, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1t9u9Nv; see DOW, supra note 58, at 7.
70. DOW, supra note 58, at 7 (noting that the Cuban immigrants, left Cuba and were
admitted into the U.S. in just six months). The policy is reminiscent of early detention policies to facilitate entry discussed supra Part I.A.1.
71. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON HAITIAN
MIGRANTS 2 (2005), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P960.pdf.
72. See id. at 2–3.
73. See DOW, supra note 58, at 7. In a lawsuit filed by a class of Haitians challenging the
shift in U.S. immigration policy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a decision to detain based
purely race or nationality was unlawful because it was inconsistent with in the INA and federal regulations. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985). The Court did not address the
issue of whether a noncitizen was constitutionally entitled to an individualized determination
of detention. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that determinations of admissibility,
which are largely beyond judicial review, are separate and distinct from custody determinations, which should be subject to judicial review and supported by evidence. See id. at 874–75
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Only the most perverse reading of the Constitution would deny
detained aliens the right to bring constitutional challenges to the most basic conditions of
their confinement.”).
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immigration detainees. The violence in Central America, partly fueled by U.S. foreign policy initiatives that included the
establishment and exploitation of capitalist markets in countries
like El Salvador and Guatemala, forced thousands of Central Americans to flee their countries.74 The Central American refugees made
their way to the U.S.-Mexico border where they were apprehended
and detained by immigration officials.75 The massive influx of Central American migrants overwhelmed immigration officials who
consequently asked Congress for funds to create more detention
space.76 This demand for detention beds and Reagan’s privatization
initiatives helped the private prison industry grow.77

2. Escalation of the Drug Wars and Immigration Detention
Although Reagan’s wars in Central America influenced immigration officials’ enforcement practices, the Reagan Administration’s
escalation of President Nixon’s “war on drugs” ultimately pushed
Congress to pass mandatory detention legislation.78 The deportation of noncitizens with drug-related convictions, and other
criminal offenses, became increasingly popular.
Congress moved quickly to pass legislation allowing immigration
officials to detain and deport all noncitizens with a criminal offense—especially a drug-related offense.79 On March 12, 1987,
Congress held a public hearing on immigration officials’ inability to
effectively deport noncitizens with felony convictions.80 Testimony
from state and local law enforcement officers supported a “no74. See DOW, supra note 58, at 8; Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, In Central America, Reagan
Remains a Polarizing Figure, WASH. POST, June 10, 2014, at A08 (“Admirers credit Reagan with
changing the course of Central America and helping to nurture democratic governments
and free-market systems across the region. Many said Reagan’s advocacy of open markets and
U.S.-style capitalism sowed the earliest seeds of El Salvador’s adoption of the U.S. dollar as its
official currency.”).
75. See DOW, supra note 58, at 8; see also Taylor, supra note 68, at 1100 (1995); Michael A.
Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 159, 159–160 (1990).
76. See DOW, supra note 58, at 8.
77. See infra Part II.A.1.
78. See Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, supra note 5, at 1365–68.
79. See id. at 1361, 1367–68.
80. See Illegal Alien Felons: A Federal Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Spending, Budget, and Accounting of the S. Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. (1987);
Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES 345 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). According to Taylor, the immigration enforcement agency was largely underfunded, and simply did not have the
infrastructure to detain individuals apprehended inside the United States who were fighting
their deportation. Id. at 348.
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bond” policy for convicted felons who did not have legal immigration status in order to prevent them from “buying their way out of
detainment.”81 The following year, the Senate amended a House
bill in an informal conference and without public debate. The bill
later became the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), which required the mandatory detention of any noncitizen convicted of an
“aggravated felony.”82
The modern mandatory detention regime was thus born with the
passage of the ADAA.83 Despite the appearance of a thorough investigation, Congress spent little time contemplating the impact of the
wide-reaching mandate.84 Immigration officers were now stripped
of discretionary authority concerning the custody determinations of
large classes of noncitizens. Many experts, including immigration
officials, considered the statute to be “unduly harsh, unrealistic,
and unwise.”85
Less than a year after the ADAA’s enactment, Congress held another hearing to discuss procedures for improving the
identification, detention, and deportation of noncitizens with criminal convictions.86 During the hearing, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law
remarked that “there also seems to be overly generous behavior by
the immigration judges relating to the steps taken to impose bonds
on individuals . . . who ought to be detained.”87 Shortly thereafter,
Congress expanded the aggravated felony definition.88 As a result,
81. Illegal Alien Felons: A Federal Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Spending,
Budget, and Accounting of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 9 (1987) (statement of Robert Dempsey, Comm’r, Florida Dep’t of Law Enforcement) (internal quotations
omitted).
82. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong. § 7343(a)(2) (1988) (“The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien convicted of an aggravated felony upon completion of the alien’s sentence
for such conviction. Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Attorney General shall not release
such felon from custody.”).
83. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, Sec. 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat. 4181,
4470 (amending 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(a)(2) to provide for mandatory detention of certain
noncitizens with criminal convictions).
84. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 345.
85. See id.
86. Criminal Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 3333 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
Int’l Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989).
87. Id. at 35.
88. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990)
(expanding the definition of aggravated felony to include crimes of violence with a sentence
of at least five years). The Immigration Act of 1990 did limit the mandatory detention of
aggravated felons to non-lawful permanent residents. Id. § 504, 104 Stat. 4978, 5049–50 (providing entitlement to release on bond for lawful permanent residents who could show that
they were not a flight risk or a danger to the community). The amendment to exclude lawful
permanent residents from mandatory detention was a response to several district court rulings that lawful permanent residents had a significant liberty interest that was implicated
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the average population of detainees increased from 4,062 in 1980
to 7,475 in 1995.89

3. The Conflation of Terrorism and Immigration
Congress continued its press for increased mandatory immigration detention in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing in
1993. Two years before, U.S. immigration authorities granted Sheik
Rahman, one of the terrorists believed to have been responsible for
the bombing, a green card.90 After learning about Rahman’s ties to
terrorism, authorities revoked the green card and released him
from custody.91 Shortly after the bombing, Congress held a hearing
to consider eliminating immigration officials’ discretionary authority to release certain noncitizens not already subject to mandatory
detention.92 The U.S. Department of Justice was unequivocal in its
opposition to the proposal, stating that “[immigration officials do]
not have sufficient resources to detain each and every criminal
alien until removal can be effected. . . . We believe that the current
evaluation of ‘flight risk’ and ‘danger to the community’ when considering the release of an aggravated felon . . . is appropriate.”93
Congress’s fixation on immigration detention culminated three
years later when it passed sweeping legislation that overhauled
many sections of the INA, including the mandatory detention provision.94 The Republican Party had recently won both chambers of
when detained, and that those persons consequently had the right to a bond hearing. See,
e.g., Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Notwithstanding the fact
that bail is by no means an absolute right, one must be afforded an opportunity to present a
case for being released on bail pending a final adjudication of deportability . . . .”). Congress
subsequently amended the statute to allow lawful permanent residents a bond hearing. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504, 104 Stat. 4978, 5049–50 (1990).
89. See JANE GUSKIN & DAVID L. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS (2007); DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES? 6 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf.
90. See JULIE FARNAM, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS UNDER THE THREAT OF TERRORISM 8
(2005).
91. See id. at 9–10.
92. Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993).
93. Id. at 100 (Department of Justice’s written response to follow-up questions from the
hearing).
94. See DOW, supra note 58, at 9. In 1994, the number of criminal offenses that qualified
as aggravated felonies was further expanded to include crimes like theft, fraud, and burglary.
See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4321–22 (1994).
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Congress, and anti-immigrant rhetoric was on the rise.95 Former
General Counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), David Martin, aptly noted that “the ‘criminal alien’ slogan,
for all its power on the campaign trail, embraces a vast spectrum of
human character and behavior. Some such criminals are truly dangerous, but a large fraction of this class made single mistakes or had
shown genuine rehabilitation and remorse.”96 Eager to fill campaign promises of being tough on immigration, politicians again
made the deportation of noncitizens with criminal convictions a
legislative priority.97 Expanding mandatory detention was one such
legislative initiative.
Laws passed in 1996 expanding mandatory immigration detention surprised many immigration officials who were in the midst of
pursuing methods of supervision that did not involve physical confinement. On April 11, 1996, INS officials and advocates met in
Washington, DC, to discuss a new supervised release program designed by the Vera Institute of Justice.98 The program was a means
of humanely monitoring noncitizens released from detention to ensure compliance with immigration orders.99 After spending
considerable resources on the program, immigration officials
hoped it would conserve sparse and expensive detention bed
space.100
Less than two weeks after the April 1996 meeting, Congress pulled the rug out from under INS, using the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) as a Trojan horse for the first
of two mandatory detention policy expansions. Increased anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the public fueled the law.101 AEDPA
stripped the INS of its discretion to release noncitizens, who had
been convicted of a wide range of criminal offenses, from detention. At its signing, President Clinton noted that the “bill . . . makes
a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism.”102
The new detention mandate overwhelmed immigration authorities. They quickly lobbied Congress to revisit AEDPA’s mandatory
95. Taylor, supra note 80, at 349, 351.
96. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64 (2001).
97. See id. at 62–65.
98. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 351.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 349 (noting newspaper headlines in the New York Times, such as Moves to
Deport Aliens for Drugs are Not Pressed and Porous Deportation System Gives Criminals Little to Fear).
102. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 721 (Apr. 24, 1996).
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detention language, which the Clinton Administration also considered a “must-fix.”103 Five months later, Congress responded by
passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which not only endorsed AEDPA’s mandatory
detention provisions, but also broadened those provisions to cover
more criminal offenses.104 Like the passage of the ADAA, there was
no public debate prior to IIRAIRA’s enactment.105
Although Congress did allow INS a two-year delay before requiring the implementation of the newly expanded mandatory
detention statute, detention rates quickly rose.106 For example, in
1985, the daily immigration detention capacity was approximately
2,200. In 1995 it tripled to 6,600, and six years later it more than
tripled again to approximately 20,000.107 As the detention population increased, INS became a “mini BOP [Bureau of Prisons],”
without the infrastructure or corrections expertise.108

II. THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY’S ROLE
IMMIGRATION DETENTION

IN

The private prison industry has benefited significantly from the
implementation of the mandatory detention statute, which significantly increased detention numbers. As industry profits grew,
private prisons funneled proceeds into lobbying efforts and congressional campaign coffers.109 Today, private prisons wield a level
103. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 353.
104. Id.
105. One U.S. Senator lamented that the process was too rushed and opaque considering
the extreme repercussions on the immigration system:
[I]t was . . . essentially a closed process. Not only were many of the members of the
conference committee not given the opportunity to participate, at the conclusion of
the conference they were not even allowed to offer amendments to try to modify provisions which were found to be objectionable. So we have a product today which has
not had the kind of thoughtful dialog and debate which we associate with a conference report which is presented to the U.S. Senate for final consideration.
142 CONG. REC. S11514 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Graham).
106. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 353. Taylor notes that the Vera Institute’s supervised
release pilot project went forward despite the drastically new legal landscape, and the results
of the project showed great promise. Id. at 354.
107. See id. at 349. Today, DHS is required to maintain a daily average detention population of 34,000. See H.R. 2217, 113th Cong. (2013) (“[F]unding made available under this
heading shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000 detention beds through September 30,
2014.”).
108. DOW, supra note 58, at 9 (quoting former INS official George Taylor).
109. See Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit
with an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP 11 (2015), http://grassrootsleader
ship.org/sites/default/files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf.
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of political capital that can ensure harsh custody policies and practices.110 This guarantees a large detention population and
correspondingly high profits.111 Mandatory detention is expensive
and unwarranted, but it is particularly egregious when detainees
are held in private prison facilities that employ cost-saving measures
to maximize profits but sacrifice detainees’ health and safety.
This Part will discuss the private prison industry’s role in immigration detention and its immense political power. Section A will
provide an overview of the private prison industry. It first examines
the history of the for-profit prison industry in the United States.
Next, it discusses the current confinement conditions at some private prison facilities. Section B examines the breadth of the
industry’s current political influence. It focuses on the industry’s
current lobbying efforts and campaign contributions, demonstrating how the industry played a key role in creating some of today’s
strictest enforcement and detention policies.

A. An Overview of the Private Prison Industry
Modern for-profit immigration detention facilities were created
in the mid-1980s, but private prisons have been a part of the United
States penal system since the 18th century. The conditions of today’s private prisons are not as egregious as the appalling
conditions of their predecessors, but today’s conditions reflect
themes first evident in earlier private detention facilities. Cost-cutting measures and lucrative public-private partnership agreements
propelled private prisons into the multi-billion dollar industry it is
today.112

1. The Private Prison Industry’s Disturbing History
The for-profit prison model was introduced in the 18th century
and became common, especially in southern states, in the 19th century. Early for-profit detention facilities were either privately owned
or state-operated. Owners designed facilities to leverage prison
110. See infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes.
111. See Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america.
112. See id. at 97.
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labor for profit.113 During the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era,
many southern states adopted a convict-lease program.114 Freed
slaves were incarcerated on trumped-up petty offense charges, incarcerated, and then leased to local businesses.115 Prisons required
inmates to perform hard labor on crop fields and railroads, and in
mines and other industries.116 The program created a source of
cheap labor for industries that previously relied on slave labor.
When detention populations dipped below the demand for labor,
the legislature passed laws designed to incarcerate more of the
black population.117 Convicts were subject to abuse, poor living conditions, and were often worked to death.118 One commentator
noted that “[n]ot a single leased convict ever lived long enough to
serve a sentence of ten years or more.”119
The conditions at Parchman Farm, one of the most infamous forprofit prisons in the South, illustrated the circumstances detainees
held in early for-profit prisons endured. The state of Mississippi
purchased the cotton plantation in 1904, turned it into a prison,
and then used the prisoners to tend the cotton from which the state
made an enormous profit.120 Racial discrimination and deplorable
conditions were the hallmarks of Parchman.121 In 1972, a federal
court held that the living conditions at Parchman were “cruel and
unusual” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.122 The court noted
113. Antje Deckert & William Wood, Prison Privatization and Contract Facilities, in CORREC221 (William J. Chambliss ed., 2011); see Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private
Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 450–51 (2005).
114. See Deckert & Wood, supra note 113, at 221.
115. See Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of
Slavery?, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-inthe-united-states-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
116. See id.; DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 35–36 (1996).
117. See Dolovich, supra note 113, at 451–52. One such legislative initiative was the 1876
Mississippi “Pig Law” which significantly increased the prison sentence for stealing a farm
animal or any property valued at more than ten dollars. Id.; OSHINSKY, supra note 116, at
40–41 (noting that the “Pig Law” spurred a dramatic rise in the convict population from 272
in 1874 to 1,072 in 1877).
118. Dolovich, supra note 113, at 452 (“Because the prisons ensured a steady supply of
convicts, from the contractors’ perspective one convict was as good as another. Many contractors therefore routinely worked their charges literally to death.”). For example, a new warden
of the Alabama state penitentiary described the inmates as “worn-out, battered men who
lived like animals in disgusting quarters, where they breathed and drank their bodily exhalation and excrement.” OSHINSKY, supra note 116, at 78 (internal quotations omitted). He
concluded that the convict-lease system was “a disgrace to the State [and] a reproach to the
civilization.” Id.
119. OSHINSKY, supra note 116, at 46.
120. See id. at 109 (noting that in 1905 Parchman produced a $185,000 profit).
121. See id. at 137.
122. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 886 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
TIONS
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that convicts at Parchman lived in racially segregated and overcrowded barracks called “cages,” and they frequently endured
brutal lashings and solitary confinement.123
After World War I, prisons slowly became public, non-profit institutions. The late 20th century marked a period of privatization and
booming prison populations.124 Laws passed in the 1920s and 1930s
explicitly barred prisons from engaging in profit-seeking activities.125 But, a rising prison population and shrinking state revenue
led to the repeal of these laws in 1979.126 A new federal program
that allowed prisons to sell products made by inmates for a profit
replaced restrictive laws.127 In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration’s push for increased privatization in formerly public sectors,
including prisons, also helped reincarnate the for-profit prison
industry.128
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), a for-profit prison
company incorporated in 1983, opened the first privately owned
immigration detention facility in 1984.129 According to a CCA
founder, the company was built on the belief that selling prisons
was “just like . . . selling cars, or real estate, or hamburgers.”130 In
1983, CCA won the country’s first federal contract with INS to detain noncitizens.131 A year later, it opened its detention facility for
noncitizen detainees in Houston, Texas.132 Shortly after opening,
CCA received its “first day’s pay for eighty-seven undocumented
aliens” on January 22, 1984, according to CCA co-founder Don
Hutto, who even fingerprinted the new detainees himself.133
123. Id. at 887–90.
124. See Deckert & Wood, supra note 113, at 221–22.
125. Id. at 222.
126. Id. at 222–23.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The CCA Story: Our Company History, CORRS. CORP. OF AM., http://www.correctionscorp.com/our-history (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
130. Matt Stroud, “Just Like Selling Hamburgers”: 30 Years of Private Prisons in the U.S.,
FORBES (June 21, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mattstroud/2013/06/21/
just-like-selling-hamburgers-30-years-of-private-prisons-in-the-u-s/ (citing GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, THE DIRTY THIRTY: NOTHING TO CELEBRATE ABOUT 30 YEARS OF CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA (2013)).
131. Deckert & Wood, supra note 113, at 223.
132. DOW, supra note 58, at 97. The Houston facility was actually a motel that had been
leased to CCA. Id. The facility was so rudimentary that some detainees escaped by pushing
the air-conditioning units out of their motel rooms. See id.
133. Lee Fang, How Private Prisons Game the Immigration System, THE NATION (Feb. 27,
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/173120/how-private-prisons-game-immigrationsystem#.
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2. Conditions at Today’s Private Prisons
Prior to his tenure at CCA, Hutto served as the Commissioner of
the Arkansas Department of Correction,134 which operated more
like a private enterprise than a public, non-profit institution. Even
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the system was run by officials
who “evidently tried to operate their prisons at a profit.”135 When
Hutto was appointed to oversee the Arkansas penal system in 1971,
it had been labeled by a federal court as a “dark and evil world
completely alien to the free world.”136
Hutto inherited the correctional system’s abhorrent prison conditions, but he dragged his feet in improving prison conditions in
Arkansas despite federal court oversight. Admonishing Hutto, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in 1974 that there was “a
continuing failure by the correctional authorities to provide a constitutional and, in some respects, even a humane environment
within their institutions.”137 Some of the inhumane conditions were
reminiscent of the conditions at early 20th century for-profit prisons like Parchman. According to the Eighth Circuit, Hutto’s
prisons continued to exhibit severe overcrowding; lack access to basic healthcare; employ convicts to supervise other inmates as part of
a trusty program; punish inmates by forcing them to run in front of
vehicles or guards on horseback; deprive prisoners of basic necessities in solitary confinement; and condone racially discriminatory
practices.138
Although conditions in today’s private prison facilities are better
than the Arkansas prison system of the 1960s and 1970s or the forprofit prisons of the Reconstruction Era, similarities persist. Some
detention facilities continue to exploit prison populations as a pool
of cheap labor. A recent article in The New York Times noted that
some immigration detention facilities pay detainees as little as 13
cents per hour to perform work that would otherwise be done by a
contractor paid at the federal minimum wage rate of $7.25 per
hour.139 Private prison cost-saving measures, such as inadequately
134. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, FACTS BROCHURE 30 (2004), available at
http://adc.arkansas.gov/resources/Documents/facts_brochure_2004.pdf.
135. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 n.3 (1978).
136. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The U.S. Supreme Court’s
detailed recounting of the prison conditions was gruesome. See, e.g., Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682
n.4 (“Inmates were lashed with a wooden-handled leather strap five feet long and four inches
wide.”); id. at 682 n.5 (“The ‘Tucker telephone,’ a hand-cranked device, was used to administer electrical shocks to various sensitive parts of an inmate’s body.”).
137. Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1974).
138. See id. at 200–10.
139. Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2014 at
A1.
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trained guards, low guard to detainee ratios, food shortages, and
poor sanitation compromise detainee health and safety.140 For example, some accuse CCA’s Stewart detention facility in Georgia, the
largest immigration detention center in the country, of providing
limited medical attention, inedible food, and inhumane living
quarters.141 In 1998, a federal court enjoined the transfer of prisoners to a CCA prison that was plagued with violence, including
multiple stabbings, murder, and excessive use of tear gas on
detainees.142
The private prison industry claims that its cost-savings are beneficial to the taxpayer because they allow the industry to contract for
bed space with the federal government at a low rate.143 Setting aside
the terrible conditions that certain cost-saving measures create, it is
hard to believe that savings materialize in cheaper government contracts and do not line the pockets of private prison investors. The
author of a 2009 DHS-commissioned immigration detention study
noted:
ICE was always relying on others for responsibilities that are
fundamentally those of the government. . . . If you don’t have
the competency to know what is a fair price to ask and negotiate the most favorable rates for the best service, then the
likelihood that you are going to overspend is greater.144
DHS admits that it spends approximately $166 per day to detain
a single adult.145 Better cost-savings, humane treatment, and effective supervision can be accomplished by implementing alternatives
to detention, such as electronic monitoring, telephonic check-ins,

140. See Lucas Anderson, Note, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for
Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113, 125–26 (2009).
141. Sadhbh Walshe, Expensive and Inhumane: The Shameful State of US Immigrant Detention,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/03/
us-immigrant-detention-expensive-inhumane.
142. See Cheryl W. Thompson, D.C. Must Stop Sending Inmates to Ohio Prison; Court Says City
Failed to Cull Violent Ones, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1998, at A08 (noting that the prison demonstrated “a deliberate indifference to the conditions of the prisoners”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL INSPECTION AND REVIEW OF THE NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER (1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/report-attorney-generalinspection-and-review-northeast-ohio-correctional-center.
143. Burke & Wides-Munoz, supra note 15 (quoting a spokesman for GEO Group claiming that private prisons “have been demonstrated to achieve significant cost savings for the
taxpayers”).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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and DHS home visits.146 A 2013 investigative report showed that alternatives to detention can cost as little as 70 cents per day.147 But
legislative policies and executive practices, including mandatory detention, continue to block the genuine use of alternatives to
detention. The private prison industry ensures the continued existence of these laws by lobbying legislators and contributing to their
political campaigns.148

B. The Political Power of Today’s Private Prison Industry
Legislation repealing or restricting the mandatory detention of
noncitizens would undoubtedly result in diminished profits for private prisons. In a 2013 SEC filing, CCA warned investors that:
[A]ny changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances
or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentence, thereby potentially reducing
demand for correctional facilities to house them. . . . Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some
offenders on probation with electronic monitoring who would
otherwise be incarcerated.149
Another large private prison company similarly warned that
“[i]mmigration reform laws which are currently a focus for legislators and politicians at the federal, state and local level also could
materially adversely impact us.”150 As one commentator noted, “It’s
hard to imagine any greater disconnect between public good and
private profit: the interest of private prisons lies not in the obvious
social good of having the minimum necessary number of inmates
but in having as many as possible, housed as cheaply as possible.”151
146. See Anil Kalhan. Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDE BAR 42,
54–55 (2010) (providing a comprehensive examination of alternatives to detention); see also
Kate Linthicum, Push for Cheaper Alternative to Immigrant Detention Grows, L.A. TIMES (May 31,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-detention-20140601-story.html
(“According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials, about 90% of immigrants in
[alternatives to detention programs] comply with the requirements and show up for required
court hearings.”).
147. MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 9 (providing a detailed examination
of the millions of dollars in taxpayer savings that could be achieved by using more alternatives to detention).
148. See Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 260 (2013).
149. CORRS CORP. OF AM., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 27 (Feb. 27, 2013).
150. THE GEO GRP., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 30 (Mar. 1, 2013).
151. Gopnik, supra note 111.
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Critics raised concerns about the industry’s political motives
since their birth in the 1980s. A year after CCA opened its Houston
facility in 1984, The New York Times published an article by Kenneth
Schoen, former Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections, which
foreshadowed the private prison industry’s future political influence. Schoen wrote:
The development of a private prison lobby is a . . . concern.
Private operators whose growth depends upon an expanding
prison population may push for ever harsher sentences. With
the public’s unabating fear of crime and lawmakers shrinking
from any move that appears to be soft on criminals, the developing private prison lobby will be hard to resist.152
The following year, the Nashville-based CCA used political connections and $100,000 in lobbying services to push a prison
privatization bill through the Tennessee legislature, which helped
propel the company into the multi-billion dollar enterprise it is today.153 CCA’s leadership and lobbying staff at the time had
unusually strong ties to Tennessee politicians: CCA president Tom
Beasley was a former Tennessee Republican Party Chairman; a CCA
lobbyist managed two of then-Governor Lamar Alexander’s winning gubernatorial campaigns and served as his chief-of-staff for
four years; Governor Alexander’s wife owned $5,000 of CCA stock;
and then-Tennessee Speaker of House owned $33,000 of CCA
stock.154
Today, the private prison industry denies lobbying directly to influence policies that affect the number of individuals in
detention.155 But a close look at its lobbying expenditures and the
152. Kenneth F. Schoen, Private Prison Operators, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1985), http://www
.nytimes.com/1985/03/28/opinion/private-prison-operators.html.
153. Fang, supra note 133; see generally Aubrey Pringle, The Winners in Immigration Control:
Private Prisons, ATLANTIC (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2013/08/the-winners-in-immigration-control-private-prisons/279128/ (examining the correlation between private prison lobbying efforts and their financial success).
154. See Harmon L. Wray, Jr., Cells for Sale, 8 SOUTHERN CHANGES 3–4 (1986), available at
http://beck.library.emory.edu/southernchanges/article.php?id=sc08-3_011. According to
Wray, both individuals sold their shares in 1985 to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Id. at
4.
155. See, e.g., CORR. CORP. OF AM., supra note 149, at 29 (“Our policy prohibits us from
engaging in lobbying or advocacy efforts that would influence enforcement efforts, parole
standards, criminal laws, and sentencing policies.”). CCA, and other private prison companies, repeatedly claim that they do not focus lobbying efforts on legislation designed to
increase the number of immigrants detained. See, e.g., Burke & Wides-Munoz, supra note 15
(“ ‘As a matter of long-standing corporate policy, CCA does not lobby on issues that would
determine the basis for an individual’s detention or incarceration.’ ”) (quoting CCA spokesman Steve Owen).
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corresponding rise in government spending on immigration detention suggests otherwise. The Associated Press recently showed that
the top three private prison companies spent at least $45 million
between 2001 and 2011 on campaign contributions and lobbyist
fees.156 A year after those expenditures began, officials sent approximately 3,300 noncitizen detainees to CCA detention facilities
pursuant to two federal contracts worth $760 million.157 In 2005,
lobbying efforts peaked when the private prison industry spent
roughly $5 million dollars.158 Over the next two years, ICE’s budget
jumped from $3.5 billion to $4.7 billion.159 By 2011, nearly half of
all immigrant detainees were held in privately-owned or privatelyrun detention facilities,160 and in 2012 private prisons held federal
contracts worth approximately $5.1 billion.161
It is unclear exactly how private prisons influence detention policies and practices, but a look behind-the-scenes of Arizona’s recent
anti-immigrant law, the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act (Senate Bill 1070), may illuminate how the industry affects legislation. Part of Senate Bill 1070 required Arizona
police officers to detain anyone they stopped who could not show
legal immigration status.162 The bill was initially crafted at a 2009
meeting in Washington, DC, between state legislators and private
corporations.163 CCA representatives and the Arizona state senator
who would later introduce the bill on the statehouse floor attended
the meeting and consulted with each other about the potential legislation.164 When the bill was introduced at the Arizona capitol, a
surprising thirty-six legislators co-sponsored the bill.165 CCA quickly
hired a high-powered lobbyist to work the capitol and within six
months CCA and two other large private prison companies donated
156. Private prisons profit from illegal immigrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-private-prisons-profit-from-illegal-immigrants/.
157. Id.
158. Burke & Wides-Munoz, supra note 15.
159. See Associated Press, supra note 156.
160. Burke & Wildes-Munoz, supra note 15.
161. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 156.
162. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (Supp. 2010). Three provisions of Senate Bill 1070
were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court on federal preemption grounds, but the Court
held that section 2(B) was improperly enjoined by the court below. See Arizona v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (“At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed
in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.”).
163. See Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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to a majority of the co-sponsors’ election campaigns.166 Only four
days after its introduction, the bill passed the legislature and was
signed by Governor Janet Brewer—who at the time had two former
private prison company lobbyists as her top advisors.167
Today’s political landscape continues to favor the private prison
industry’s interest in a large detention population. A comprehensive immigration reform bill, which would have offered a pathway
to citizenship for millions of noncitizens, failed to pass both chambers of Congress.168 Some allege that the private prison industry
had a hand in squelching the reform efforts.169 Enforcement initiatives that involve expanding immigration detention capacity and
increasing the number of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention have gained traction in Congress. Recently, the House
Judiciary Committee passed the Strength and Fortify Enforcement
Act (SAFE Act).170 The bill, introduced by Chairman Bob Goodlatte
and Representative Trey Gowdy, would greatly expand the definition of an aggravated felony. It also would explicitly preclude
alternatives to detention, resulting in millions more noncitizens becoming subject to mandatory detention.171 Campaign finance

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Clarence Page, Obama breaks through Congress’ brick wall on immigration, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/ct-obamacongress-immigration-boehner-perspec-1123-20141121-column.html; Rachel Weiner, How immigration reform failed, over and over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/.
169. See, e.g., Peter Cervantes-Gautschi, How the For-Profit Corporate Prison Lobby Killed Immigration Reform, ALTERNET (July 14, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/print/immigration/howprofit-corporate-prison-lobby-killed-immigration-reform (discussing the private prison industry’s alleged role in contributing campaign finance to key senators and representatives to
ensure immigration reform’s demise); Fang, supra note 133.
170. Ed O’Keefe, House Panel Approves Controversial Immigration Bill, WASH. POST (June 19,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/19/house-panelapproves-controversial-immigration-bill/.
171. See Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 2278 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (“It’s alarming that this bill would turn millions
of undocumented immigrants into criminals overnight.”) (statement of Rep. John Conyers,
Jr., Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION CTR., CRACKING THE SAFE ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT AND CONTEXT OF H.R. 2278,
THE “STRENGTHEN AND FORTIFY ENFORCEMENT ACT” 5 (2013). Chairman Goodlatte is known
for being particularly tough on immigration enforcement and detention. In a May 22, 2014
letter to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, Goodlatte admonished the agency for releasing too
many noncitizens from detention and discouraging the use of alternatives to detention. See
Letter from Bob Goodlatte, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on the Jud., Chairman, to
Jeh Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sec’y (May 22, 2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/01950795-d8b2-456e-95a1-09fba98947f1/1370-001.pdf.
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records from 2013 and 2014 reveal that Goodlatte and other members of congressional leadership received significant campaign
contributions from private prison political actions committees.172
III. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS: RETHINKING
DETENTION STATUTE

THE

MANDATORY

Private prison’s political power swayed Congress to maintain the
excessive, costly, and inhumane mandatory detention regime. Repealing the mandatory detention statute and returning discretion
to DHS to make its own custody determinations would be a positive
step in alleviating the problems of mandatory detention. But private prisons would certainly flex their political muscle to oppose
such a legislative initiative. Therefore, an immediate solution—that
does not involve Congress—needs to be implemented.
The solution lies with DHS’s power to interpret and execute the
mandatory detention statute. DHS leadership has recently signaled
that it is receptive to enforcement practices that do not unnecessarily detain noncitizens. For example, the agency released
prosecutorial discretion guidelines in 2011 that suggested it would
consider alternatives to detention for noncitizens who are low removal priorities.173 Additionally, in May 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary that
the immigration bed quota required the agency to maintain a capacity of 34,000 detention beds, but did not require it to keep those
beds filled.174 Therefore, the atmosphere in the executive branch
appears to be ripe for reforming the way DHS interprets and executes the mandatory detention statute.
The mandatory detention statute states that DHS “shall take into
custody” certain noncitizens.175 Currently, DHS interprets the term
“custody” to require physical confinement at a detention facility.176
However, DHS could either: (1) interpret “custody” to encompass
172. See Disclosure Data Search, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/finance/
disclosure/disclosure_data_search.shtml (using the search function to reveal the campaign
contributors).
173. See Memorandum from John Morton, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel (Jun.
17, 2011).
174. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
70 (2014) (statement of Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.) (“The statutory
requirement is beds, not people. A lot of people think it’s people, but it says beds.”).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2014).
176. See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 601, 632 (2010) (citing Unofficial Minutes from the Chicago American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) Chapter ICE Liaison Meeting (Nov. 10, 2009)
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other forms of restraint, including less costly and more humane alternatives to detention; or (2) interpret the statute to allow for
alternatives to detention as “terms of custody” rather than “terms of
release” which would allow DHS to maintain control over the
noncitizen’s supervision and thereby satisfy the mandatory detention statute.177
This Part will further explain how DHS could interpret the
mandatory detention statute to prevent the needless detention of
thousands of noncitizens. Part A argues that DHS should broadly
interpret the term “custody” to allow for alternatives to detention.
Part B asserts that DHS should, alternatively, interpret the
mandatory detention statute to allow for detention alternatives as
“terms of custody.”

A. The Term “Custody” Should be Broadly Interpreted to Include Forms
of Restraint Other Than Physical Confinement
Congress has given DHS no guidance on how to interpret the
term “custody” in the mandatory detention statute. But the widelyaccepted tools of statutory interpretation suggest that DHS could
read the term more broadly than requiring physical confinement.
Several canons of statutory interpretation—to give a term its plain
meaning, to mention expressly one thing excludes another, and to
decipher a term’s meaning by examining the rest of the statute—
suggest that a broad interpretation of the word “custody” is
warranted
The plain meaning of “custody” suggests a broader definition
than physical confinement. Although imprisonment is clearly a
form of custody, the term “custody” is more broadly defined as the
general control of something or someone. For example, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “custody” as “the care and control of a thing or
(on file with author) (“DHS considers itself without legal authority to use electronic monitoring for persons who must be held in custody under the statute because it does not consider
monitoring to be ‘custody.’ ”).
177. Similar recommendations have previously been suggested and explained to varying
degrees by commentators and advocates. See, e.g., Heeren, supra note 176, at 631–33 (suggesting that immigration judges be afforded more statutory discretion to review DHS custody
determinations, and suggesting wider implementation of alternatives to detention); Letter
from Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n to David Martin, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Brandon Prelogar, Office of Policy, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 10–16 (Aug. 6,
2010) (on file with author) (suggesting a broader interpretation of the term “custody” in INA
section 236(c) and suggesting the use of alternatives to detention as a condition of confinement). Others have suggested a limit on the number of months an individual should be
mandatorily detained. See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 390–401 (2014).
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person for inspection, preservation, or security.”178 Merriam-Webster’s
Online Dictionary defines “custody” as the “immediate charge and
control (as over a ward or a suspect) exercised by a person or an
authority.”179 MacMillan Online Dictionary’s generic definition of
“custody” is “the protection or care of someone or something.”180
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “custody” as “[s]afe keeping,
protection, defence; charge, care, guardianship.”181 All of these definitions suggest an interpretation of custody that is broader than
physical confinement.
Furthermore, if Congress required DHS to read “custody” as “detention,” it could easily have crafted the mandatory detention
statute to define the word narrowly. An examination of the statute
and other provisions within the INA demonstrate that Congress
used the term “detention” and its derivations when it meant physical confinement. Section 236(a) of the INA is entitled, “Arrest,
detention, and release,” is illustrative.182 The provision authorizes
DHS to “arrest[ ] and detain[ ] pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.”183 The statute further permits DHS to “continue to detain the arrested alien.”184
Finally, section 236(a) of the INA authorizes DHS to “at any time
. . . revoke a bond or parole . . . and detain the alien.”185 Conversely,
the term “detention” appears only in the title of the mandatory detention provision.186 Neither “detention” nor its derivations appear
anywhere else in that statute.
The language of section 236A of the INA concerning the
“[m]andatory detention of suspected terrorist” is similar to the language of the mandatory detention statute, but it is also explicitly
requires that suspected terrorists be detained.187 Although section
236A of the INA likewise uses the phrase “shall take into custody,”
the remaining language of the statute makes clear that noncitizens

178. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (8th ed. 2004).
179. Custody Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/custody (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
180. Custody Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/
us/dictionary/american/custody (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
181. Custody Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
46305?redirectedFrom=custody#eid (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2014).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 1226(a)(1).
185. Id. § 1226(b) (2014).
186. Id. § 1226(c) (“Detention of criminal aliens”).
187. Id. § 1226A (2014).
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who are deemed to be suspected terrorists must be physically detained.188 Most significantly, section 236A(a)(6) specifies that there
is a six month limitation for those subject to prolonged mandatory
detention pursuant to section 236A.189 The limitation reflects the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. In Zadvydas, the
Court condemned indefinite detention in situations where authorities issued a removal order but removal is not reasonably
foreseeable.190
Case law also supports the proposition that the term “custody”
does not require “detention.” In Reno v. Koray, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 changed language in
the criminal bail statute from “custody” to “official detention.”191
The Court reasoned that the change was made to conform more
clearly to the language of other statutory amendments made by the
Act.192 Such an alteration presupposes that Congress thought that
the terms “detention” and “custody” had different meanings.
In Matter of Aguilar-Aquino, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) examined a nearly identical change in an immigration detention statute, but reasoned that the terms “custody” and “detention”
had the same meaning.193 In that case, the court examined the legislative history of section 236(a) to determine the definition of
“custody” as it is used in the corresponding federal regulation.194
The BIA found that when crafting the language of IIRIARA, Congress similarly substituted the term “custody” for the term
“detain.”195 Relying on a Congressional conference committee report, the BIA reasoned that, despite the deliberate change in
188. Id. Section 236A(c) notes that “provisions of this section shall not be applicable to
any other provision of this Act,” but the language Congress chose in crafting this section of
the INA illustrates its ability to indicate clearly when mandatory detention is to be used. 8
U.S.C. § 1226A(c) (2012).
189. Id. at § 1226A(a)(6).
190. Zadyvas v. U.S., 533 U.S. 678, 698–99 (2001). The Court decided Zadvydas about
four months before section 236A was enacted pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 271, 350 (2001).
191. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 59–60 (1995).
192. See id.
193. In re Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747, 752 (BIA 2009).
194. Id. at 750–52 (analyzing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1), which confers jurisdiction of custody issues on an immigration judge “If the alien has been released from custody, an
application for amelioration of the terms of release. . .[was] filed within 7 days of release.”).
195. Id. at 751. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. Koray, the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 similarly changed the language in the bail statute from “custody” to “official
detention.” See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. at 59–60. The Court ultimately held that detention
required physical confinement, but in his dissent, Justice Stevens reasoned that “proof that
confinement [at an official detention facility] constitutes official detention certainly is not
proof that no other form of confinement can constitute official detention.” Id. at 67 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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language, “Congress used the terms ‘custody’ and ‘detain’ interchangeably and did not intend for them to be afforded different
meanings.”196 Ultimately, the BIA held that the term “custody” requires physical confinement.197
In Matter of Aguilar-Aquino, the BIA also noted that the immigration judge erroneously relied on federal habeas corpus
jurisprudence to determine the meaning of “custody.”198 The
judge’s ruling was based on cases like Jones v. Cunningham, in which
the Supreme Court broadly interpreted “custody” to mean any restraint on personal liberty “not shared by the public generally.”199
The BIA summarily disagreed with the immigration judge’s reliance
on habeas corpus jurisprudence because “custody” in that context
“is interpreted expansively to ensure that no person’s imprisonment or detention is illegal.”200 But “custody” should similarly be
interpreted broadly in the mandatory detention context to ensure
that no person’s imprisonment is disproportionate to the need for
confinement.
Matter of Aguilar-Aquino supports the argument that “custody”
should be read broadly to include restraints other than detention.
Most notably, the Court recognized that “a person who is in custody
is not necessarily in detention [and] one who is in detention is necessarily in custody.”201 The Court also reasoned “that both a person
who has been released on parole and one who remains incarcerated can be considered to be in ‘custody.’ ”202 Other courts have
agreed that “custody” is not limited to confinement in a government detention facility.203
196. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747 at 752.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–43 (1963) (holding that conditions of parole qualified as being in the “custody” of the parole board).
200. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747 at 752. The term “custody” has been broadly
interpreted by multiple courts to mean varying degrees of physical confinement and restraint, including probation, supervised release, and mandatory attendance at rehabilitative
classes. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (conditions placed on
a defendant released on recognizance while his case was on appeal); Dow v. Circuit Court of
the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (mandatory attendance at a rehabilitative
program). Individuals attempting to escape various types of restraints have been prosecuted
pursuant to 18 USC § 751(a) for escaping federal custody. See United States. v. Rudinsky, 439
F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1971) (escape from a pre-release guidance center); Perez-Calo v. United
States, 757 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1991) (escape from a substance abuse program).
201. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747 at 752.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Attorney General, 452 Fed. App’x. 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“home confinement . . . [was] a serious restriction of liberty [and] qualified as imprisonment under the INA”) (internal quotations omitted).
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For all these reasons, DHS should interpret “custody” in the
mandatory detention statute to include forms of restraint beyond
confinement in a detention facility.

B. Mandatory Detention Includes Alternatives to Detention as
“Terms of Custody” Rather Than “Terms of Release”
DHS could also utilize alternatives to detention if such alternatives are considered “conditions of confinement” rather than
“terms of release from detention.” The distinction seems semantic,
but it was critical to the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of Aguilar. In that
case, the BIA held that “[t]he conditions placed by the DHS on the
respondent’s release, including the home confinement and electronic monitoring device, constituted ‘terms of release’ and were
not ‘custody’ within the meaning of section 236(a) of the [INA].”204
The court concluded that the Immigration Judge did not have jurisdiction to review DHS’s terms of release because the petition for
review was not filed within seven days of the respondent’s release
from detention.205
The distinction between “terms of release” and “conditions of
custody” was also discussed in Koray.206 In that case, the Court held
that a defendant could not be given credit for time served while he
resided at a community treatment center, pursuant to a court order, because that placement was a term of release—not a condition
of his confinement.207 In its decision, the Court gave great weight to
the Bureau of Prison’s ability to control the defendant’s confinement. According to the Court:
Unlike defendants “released” on bail, defendants who are “detained” or “sentenced” always remain subject to the control of
the Bureau. This is an important distinction, as the identity of
the custodian has both legal and practical significance. A defendant who is “released” is not in BOP’s custody, and he
cannot be summarily reassigned to a different place of confinement unless a judicial officer revokes his release, or
modifies the conditions of his release. A defendant who is “detained,” however, is completely subject to BOP’s control . . .
204. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747 at 753.
205. Id.
206. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64 (1995) (discussing the differences between detained and release for the purpose of sentence credit).
207. See id. at 64–65.
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and being in the legal custody of BOP, the Bureau has full
discretion to control many conditions of their confinement.208
In reaching its decision, the Court examined statutory language
created by the Bail Reform Act of 1984,209 which is remarkably similar to the language of the INA’s discretionary immigration
detention statute. Pursuant to both acts, a person may either be
released from custody, or detained without bail or bond. If a person
is released from custody, restrictive conditions may be imposed, but
if an adjudicator “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community[,]
the [adjudicator] shall order the detention of the person.”210 The
Court reasoned that “a defendant suffers ‘detention’ only when
committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions . . . is ‘released.’ ”211
However, defendants are considered to be detained, or in the “custody” of BOP, when BOP authorizes a release to attend classes or
work in the community.212
The Court’s decision in Koray is consistent with the reasoning of
Matter of Aguilar-Aquino. In both cases, the characterization of the
petitioner’s restrained liberty depended on whether the conditions
imposed were “terms of release” or “conditions of confinement.”
The key was whether the federal agency retained “control” over the
detainee. If less restrictive alternatives to detention are considered
“conditions of confinement,” then DHS retains control of the
noncitizen’s supervision, which should satisfy the mandatory detention statute. If alternatives to detention are administered as
conditions of custody, instead of conditions of release, then authorities
could monitor a noncitizen through less restrictive means than
physical confinement, while still in the custody and control of DHS.
Under this proposed regime, DHS would still comply with the of
the mandatory detention statute.

208. Id. at 63.
209. See id. at 57.
210. Id. (internal citations omitted).
211. Id.; see also Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003) (“[I]t is not
place, but custody, that defines imprisonment—a conceptual distinction that is consistent with
long-accepted views on this subject.”) (citing Koray, 515 U.S. at 63–65).
212. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. at 58.
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CONCLUSION
This Article argues that DHS could greatly improve the immigration detention system by adopting new interpretations of statutory
language. But this proposal is not a complete fix; even if DHS took
this approach, the immigration detention system would still need
large overhauls. Immigration reform is necessary to fix years of immigration detention laws, which were written by policymakers with
unscrupulous motives. Despite its roots in discrimination, the
mandatory detention statute has been interpreted to prevent discrimination between detainees who should be detained and those
who should not be detained. The statute is too far-reaching. The
individuals held pursuant to the mandatory detention statute are
mothers and fathers; they are bus drivers, waiters, business owners,
and lobster fishermen; they are war heroes and political activists;
and they are just as human as anyone else. Congress must repeal
the mandatory detention statute. But until it does, DHS must rethink its interpretation of it.

